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Executive	Summary		 Municipalities	across	the	Province	are	grappling	with	infrastructure	deficits.	Small,	northern,	and	rural	municipality’s	tax	assessment	base	limits	its	ability	to	garner	sufficient	revenue	to	support	operations	as	well	as	renew	and	replace	infrastructure.	Federal	and	Provincial	governments	must	step	in	and	assist.	As	a	result	the	Province	introduced	the	Ontario	Community	Infrastructure	Fund	(OCIF)	as	a	permanent	program	to	fund	critical	infrastructure	projects	for	core	assets	-	roads,	bridges,	water	and	wastewater.			 This	research	paper	seeks	to	determine	if	the	Province	can	efficiently	and	effectively	re-distribute	revenue	using	existing	financial	and	statistical	data	to	local	governments	and	to	investigate	the	effectiveness	of	an	application-based	approach	for	infrastructure	grants.				
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Introduction		 	
Municipalities	own	the	vast	majority	of	Canada’s	infrastructure	assets	but	have	very	few	revenue	tools,	mainly	property	taxes	and	user	fees,	to	raise	funds	for	the	maintenance,	replacement,	and	construction	of	capital	assets.	“Municipalities	own	over	60%	of	the	country’s	infrastructure	but	collect	just	eight	cents	of	every	tax	dollar	paid	in	Canada,	with	the	other	92	cents	going	to	federal,	provincial	and	territorial	governments”	(Federation	of	Canadian	Municipalities,	2015).	Underinvestment	in	public	infrastructure	has	created	municipal	infrastructure	deficits	across	the	province.	The	chart	below	(Ontario,	2016)	outlines	capital	spending	from	1956	to	2001	and	highlights	the:	1)	era	of	visionary	investment,	2)	era	of	neglect,	and	3)	era	of	renewal.		
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The	chart	demonstrates	a	significant	investment	per	capita	in	infrastructure	from	1956	to	1975,	which	defines	the	era	of	visionary	investment.	However,	for	the	25-year	period	between	1976	and	2000,	the	era	of	neglect,	infrastructure	spending	per	capita	was	primarily	nonexistent.	“For	25	years	Canadians	have	watched	the	symptoms	of	the	infrastructure	deficit	grow:	rusting	bridges,	crumbling	roads,	crowded	buses	and	subways,	and	thousands	of	drinking	water	warnings”	(Federation	of	Canadian	Municipalities,	2015).	Well-maintained	public	infrastructure	is	necessary	for	the	health	of	the	economy	and	quality	of	life.			 Grants	from	senior	levels	of	government	are	important	to	the	fiscal	health	of	local	governments.	It	can	be	argued	that	a	municipality	has	taxing	authority	and	can	raise	funds	for	infrastructure	investment	through	property	taxes,	but	the	ability	of	a	small	municipality	to	raise	sufficient	funds	for	infrastructure	is	limited	by	its	assessment	base.	Equalization	payments	through	grants	or	intergovernmental	transfers	from	senior	levels	of	government	are	required	to	assist	municipalities	with	infrastructure	needs.	It	can	also	be	argued	that	municipalities	are	the	creation	of	the	Province	and	must	be	accountable	to	the	Province	but	where	does	that	leave	the	role	of	municipal	councils	and	residents	in	shaping	their	communities.		The	following	research	paper	is	an	investigation	into	the	effectiveness	of	the	application-based	approach	to	the	re-distribution	of	revenue	or	grants	from	senior	levels	of	government	to	local	governments.	The	goal	of	the	research	is	to	determine	if	the	Province	has	enough	data,	both	financial	and	statistical,	to	allocate	funding	for	infrastructure	needs	using	a	needs-based	grant	allocation.	Based	on	this	information,	this	paper	poses	the	following	research	question.		
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Research	Question		
Does	the	Province	have	enough	financial	and	statistical	data	available	
to	execute	a	needs-based	grant	allocation	to	target	municipal	
infrastructure	investment	instead	of	utilizing	an	application	process	to	
allocate	funds?		This	paper	will	be	structured	as	follows:	1. Background	–	A	comprehensive	background	will	be	provided	including	examples	of	successful	grants,	evidence	of	municipal	reporting	burden,	and	current	tools	to	mitigate	infrastructure	deficits.		2. Methodology	–	A	detailed	account	of	the	design	and	data	used	to	answer	the	research	question	will	be	provided	in	this	section.	3. Results	and	Interpretation	of	Data	–	All	data	collected	will	be	presented	and	organized.	This	section	will	also	include	interpretation	of	the	data.		4. Conclusion	–	This	section	will	provide	final	thoughts	on	the	research	and	proposed	recommendations	for	the	Province.		Municipalities	are	creations	of	the	Province.	The	Province	enacts	boundaries,	mandates	responsibilities,	sets	standards	for	service	delivery,	limits	own-source	revenues	to	property	taxes	and	user	fees,	and	establishes	borrowing	limits	for	municipalities.	“The	good	news	is	that	the	high	degree	of	provincial	control	over	local	governments	in	Canada	means	that	there	cannot	be	any	visible	fiscal	crisis	at	the	local	level”	but	“the	bad	news,	however,	is	that	municipal	governments	in	Canada	have	only	very	limited	fiscal	autonomy	and	are	constrained	from	solving	the	problems	they	may	have”	(Slack	E.	,	Provincial-Local	Fiscal	Transfers	in	Canada,	
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2009).	This	research	is	important	because	it	explores	whether	there	is	a	method	available,	using	existing	data,	to	balance	control	of	municipal	spending	and	garner	efficiencies	for	revenue	re-distribution	for	senior	levels	of	government,	while	at	the	same	time	allowing	municipalities	the	ability	to	solve	local	infrastructure	deficits.				 	
	 9	
Background	
The	following	is	a	comprehensive	background	on	Federal	and	Provincial	grants	including	a	discussion	of	grant	structure,	examples	of	grants,	municipal	reporting	to	the	Province,	tools	to	mitigate	infrastructure	deficits,	and	the	new	Ontario	Community	Infrastructure	Fund	which	is	the	focus	of	the	research.	This	section	of	the	paper	will	include	a	discussion	on	grant	structure,	intergovernmental	transfers,	federal	and	provincial	grants,	municipal	reporting,	and	tools	to	mitigate	infrastructure	deficits.	The	background	will	provide	insight	into	grant	administration	and	potential	obstacles	with	the	current	granting	system.		
Grant	Structure	Grants	or	intergovernmental	transfers	from	senior	levels	of	government	are	divided	into	two	categories,	conditional/earmarked	and	unconditional.	Unconditional	grants	have	an	income	effect	on	local	governments	and	conditional	grants	have	both	a	price	and	income	effect	(Slack	E.	,	Local	Fiscal	Response	to	Intergovernmental	Transfers,	1980).	Therefore	the	donor	government	will	select	either	a	conditional	or	unconditional	grant	depending	on	the	senior	level	government’s	desired	local	fiscal	response.		 Literature	regarding	grants	and	intergovernmental	transfers	is	extensive.	Shah	and	Slack	argue	provincial-municipal	transfers	are	designed	to	address	the	following	issues:	1)	vertical	fiscal	imbalance,	2)	horizontal	fiscal	imbalance,	3)	externalities,	and	4)	as	a	response	to	political	lobbying	or	to	exert	control	(Shah,	2007)	(Slack	E.	,	2007).		
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Vertical	Fiscal	Imbalance		 “A	vertical	imbalance	occurs	when	municipalities	have	inadequate	own-source	revenues	to	meet	expenditure	responsibilities”	(Slack	E.	,	Provincial-Local	Fiscal	Transfers	in	Canada,	2009,	p.	17).	The	fiscal	gap	can	be	closed	by	the	use	of	an	unconditional	or	conditional	grant	or	by	revenue	sharing.	If	the	grant	is	unconditional	the	funds	can	be	spent	at	the	municipality’s	discretion.	Conditional	grants	must	be	spent	on	provincially	or	federally	mandated	projects.	The	grant	is	typically	allocated	using	a	formula	but	to	be	an	effective	tool	to	increase	municipal	revenues,	the	allocation	must	be	stable	and	predictable	(Slack	E.	,	Provincial-Local	Fiscal	Transfers	in	Canada,	2009).	An	example	of	a	conditional	vertical	fiscal	grant	is	Ontario’s	commitment	to	share	2	cents	per	litre	of	gasoline	revenue	with	municipalities	for	public	transit	(Toronto	Transit,	2015).		
Horizontal	Fiscal	Imbalance		 “Horizontal	fiscal	imbalance	refers	to	the	difference	in	resources	among	governments	at	the	same	level”	(Slack	E.	,	Provincial-Local	Fiscal	Transfers	in	Canada,	2009,	p.	19).	Municipalities	across	the	province	have	very	different	characteristics,	which	can	limit	its	ability	to	raise	the	necessary	resources	to	deliver	consistent	and	comparable	levels	of	service.	Equalization	payments	are	required	in	order	to	ensure	comparable	levels	of	service	are	delivered	across	the	province.	Formulas	are	used	to	determine	equalization	allocations	but	allocations	must	be	stable	and	predictable	to	ensure	province-wide	comparable	services	(Slack	E.	,	Provincial-Local	Fiscal	Transfers	in	Canada,	2009).		 	
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Externalities		 Externalities	occur	when	the	benefit	and	cost	of	a	service	cascades	over	multiple	municipal	boundaries.	Externalities	may	result	in	under	spending	due	to	perceived	benefits	accruing	outside	municipal	boundaries,	for	example,	regional	roads.	To	diffuse	the	effect	of	externalities,	the	province	will	utilize	conditional,	matching	grants	(Slack	E.	,	Provincial-Local	Fiscal	Transfers	in	Canada,	2009).	
Political		 “Transfers	are	sometimes	established	in	response	to	successful	lobbying	by	municipal	associations”	but	frequently	“provincial	governments	often	use	transfers	as	a	way	to	exert	control	over	how	municipalities	deliver	services”	(Slack	E.	,	Provincial-Local	Fiscal	Transfers	in	Canada,	2009,	p.	23).	Conditional	grants	that	do	not	require	matching	funds	are	an	excellent	tool	to	fund	projects	that	are	a	priority	for	the	province	but	a	low	priority	for	a	local	government,	for	example	the	delivery	of	land	ambulance	that	was	downloaded	to	the	local	level	in	1998.	Conditional	non-matching	grants	encourage	“local	governments	to	act	as	agents	of	the	donor	government”	(Slack	E.	,	Provincial-Local	Fiscal	Transfers	in	Canada,	2009,	p.	23).	The	Province	sets	service	standards	for	the	project	or	program	and	the	Province	also	benefits	from	the	program	being	delivered	locally	(Boadway	&	Shah,	2009).			 Through	the	use	of	different	grant	structures	the	Province	can	exert	control	over	expenditures	at	the	local	level.	This	is	important	because	municipalities	are	creatures	of	the	Province	and	act	as	agents	of	the	Province	when	providing	services	to	residents.	Even	with	grants	as	a	mechanism	to	ensure	service	standards	are	achieved,	there	are	still	obstacles	related	to	intergovernmental	transfers.		
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Intergovernmental	Transfers		 Transfers	need	to	be	designed	to	ensure	recipients	have	a	clear	mandate,	and	have	some	flexibility	to	make	decisions	but	are	held	accountable	for	spending	decisions	(Bird	&	Vaillancourt,	1998).	Yet,	there	are	still	obstacles	to	overcome	with	grants.		In	a	paper	prepared	for	a	2009	Conference	on	Grants	vs.	Earmarked	Grants:	Theory	and	Practice	titled	Provincial-Local	Fiscal	Transfers	in	Canada:	Provincial	
Control	Trumps	Local	Accountability,	author	Enid	Slack	discusses	intergovernmental	transfers	and	“evaluates	the	extent	to	which	they	are	designed	to	increase	local	accountability	or	maintain	provincial	control”	(Slack	E.	,	Provincial-Local	Fiscal	Transfers	in	Canada:	Provincial	Control	Trumps	Local	Authority,	2009,	p.	2).	Slack’s	paper	concludes	that	based	on	her	research,	grants	are	designed	to	achieve	provincial	objectives	not	local	fiscal	autonomy.			Slack	argues	that	potential	obstacles	for	grants	include:	1)	interference	with	efficient	delivery	of	service,	2)	local	decision	making	distortion,	3)	reduced	accountability,	and	4)	the	fact	that	transfers	are	rarely	stable	and	predictable.		
Interference	with	efficient	delivery	of	service:	Slack’s	research	finds	that	transfers	interfere	with	the	efficient	delivery	of	services.	Slack	contends	that	there	is	no	incentive	for	municipalities	to	use	proper	pricing	for	services	if	grants	cover	a	large	portion	of	operating	and	capital	costs.	
Local	decision	making	distortion:	Transfers	can	distort	decision-making	at	the	local	level.	In	order	to	qualify	for	a	grant,	projects	that	are	not	a	real	priority	for	the	
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community	may	get	prioritized	over	other	projects	in	an	effort	to	garner	any	amount	of	grant	funding.	
Reduced	accountability:	Transfers	can	reduce	accountability.	Slack	argues	that	accountability	can	be	blurred	when	municipalities	are	making	spending	decisions	while	another	level	of	government	is	raising	the	funds.			
Transfers	are	rarely	stable	and	predictable:	The	final	and	most	important	issue	that	Slack	identifies	relating	to	transfers	is	that	they	are	rarely	stable	and	predictable,	which	makes	planning	for	infrastructure	improvements	at	the	local	level	difficult.		
Federal	and	Provincial	Grants		 Senior	levels	of	government	have	introduced	various	grants	to	assist	municipalities	with	operating	and	capital	funding	and	to	address	the	revenue	imbalance	between	the	levels	of	government.	Two	of	these	grants	are	Canada	Gas	Tax,	and	Ontario	Municipal	Partnership	Fund	(OMPF).		
Canada	Gas	Tax		 The	Canada	Gas	Tax	fund,	a	conditional	federal	grant	administered	by	the	Association	of	Municipalities	of	Ontario	(AMO),	was	introduced	in	2005	and	has	become	a	stable	and	predictable	source	of	funding	to	assist	municipalities	with	infrastructure	investments.	Funds	are	allocated	on	a	per	capita	basis	and	municipal	allocation	estimates	are	available	to	2018.	Estimates	from	2019	to	2024	will	be	based	on	the	2016	census.	There	is	a	requirement	to	identify	municipal	infrastructure	projects	that	will	be	funded	by	Canada	Gas	Tax	and	to	report	the	performance	measures	and	outcomes	achieved.	With	a	stable	and	predictable	flow	
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of	funding,	Municipal	Councils	and	staff	can	plan	for	important	infrastructure	investments	well	into	the	future.			 The	Canada	Gas	Tax	fund	has	matured.	Municipalities	were	once	required	to	hire	external	auditors	to	confirm	that	Gas	Tax	funding	was	used	appropriately	and	in	accordance	with	agreements.	In	2009,	Infrastructure	Canada	conducted	a	program	evaluation	on	the	Gas	Tax	fund	and	found	that	the	program	“addressed	a	demonstrated	need	for	investment	in	municipal	infrastructure,	and	provided	flexibility	and	predictability	to	local	governments”	and	was	“found	to	be	efficient	cost-effective	and	accountable”	(AMO,	2017).	As	a	result	of	the	positive	evaluation	results,	the	audit	scope	migrated	from	the	conventional	audit	approach	to	a	risk	based	audit	approach.	Now	AMO	randomly	audits	only	10%	of	municipalities	to	ensure	compliance	with	the	program.		Canada	Gas	Tax	provides	a	stable,	predictable,	and	flexible	funding	source	for	municipal	infrastructure	needs.	It	has	reduced	the	reporting	burden	for	a	municipality	because	it	does	not	require	an	application	process	to	compete	for	funds	and	recently,	the	requirement	of	a	financial	audit	to	ensure	compliance	has	been	discontinued.	The	grant	is	also	easy	to	administer	for	the	federal	government	because	AMO	oversees	the	program.	AMO	is	an	association	of	Ontario	municipalities	that	works	together	to	achieve	goals	and	meet	common	challenges.	Grant	allocations	are	formula-based	and	are	allocated	based	on	recent	census	population	data.		
Ontario	Municipal	Partnership	Fund		 The	OMPF	grant	has	been	assisting	municipalities	since	approximately	2003.	It	is	an	unconditional	grant	and	it	is	the	Province’s	main	transfer	payment	to	388	
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municipalities.	The	total	funding	envelope	for	2017	is	$505	million	and	the	Province	has	made	a	commitment	to	continue	this	grant	into	the	future.	In	2014,	the	grant	was	redesigned	to	focus	assistance	on	northern	and	rural	municipalities	with	challenging	fiscal	circumstances.	OMPF	has	four	grant	components:	1)	assessment	equalization,	2)	northern	communities	grant,	3)	rural	communities	grant,	and	4)	northern	and	rural	fiscal	circumstances	grant.		The	Province	uses	a	number	of	data	inputs	and	measures	to	allocate	funds	across	the	388	participants.	For	example:		number	of	households,	weighted	tax	assessment	per	household,	rural	and	small	communities	measure,	farm	measure,	northern	and	rural	fiscal	circumstances	measure,	guaranteed	level	of	support,	and	the	prior	year	allocation.	Since	the	grant	is	unconditional	there	is	no	special	reporting	for	spending,	no	audits	to	comply	with,	applications	to	complete,	or	municipal	competition	for	funds.			 The	benefit	of	OMPF	is	that	it	targets	small,	rural	and	northern	municipalities	but	uses	data	to	quantify	the	allocation	per	municipality.	It	does	not	have	complex	reporting	requirements	such	as	an	application	process	to	compete	for	funds.	Administration	is	easy	for	the	province	due	to	the	formula-based	allocation	of	the	funds.	Allocation	of	the	grant	and	formulas	are	posted	on	the	web	making	the	process	very	transparent	and	defensible.			 Canada	Gas	Tax	and	OMPF	are	predictable,	long-term,	and	stable	revenue	sources	for	municipalities.	Both	grants	are	targeted	to	specific	municipal	needs.	All	municipalities	receive	Canada	Gas	Tax	funds	and	it	must	be	spent	on	municipal	infrastructure.	Only	388	municipalities	receive	OMPF	but	the	grant	is	targeted	to	assist	northern	and	rural	municipalities	with	challenging	fiscal	circumstances.	Both	
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grants	have	minimal	reporting	requirements,	which	reduce	the	reporting	burden	on	municipalities.	More	importantly,	both	Canada	Gas	Tax	and	OMPF	allocate	funds	based	on	available	financial	and	statistical	data	(AMO,	2017)	(Ontario,	2016).	
Municipal	Reporting	Over	time,	provincial	reporting	requirements	for	municipalities	has	increased.	New	provincial	programs	and	grant	applications	have	made	reporting	more	complex	for	municipalities.	“Steadily	municipalities	became	deeply	over	regulated	and	burdened	with	requirements	to	report	to	the	province	on	hundreds	of	programs	and	services”	(Lobo,	2017,	p.	25).	“Reporting	threatens	to	weaken	municipal	productivity	at	a	time	when	municipalities	must	modernize	to	face	increasing	demands”	(Lobo,	2017,	p.	25).		Conditional	grants	can	have	significant	reporting	requirements	when	compared	to	the	reporting	requirements	for	unconditional	grants.	Many	conditional	grants	require	formal	expressions	of	interest,	complex	applications,	municipal	competition	for	funds,	senior	government	review	and	ranking,	grant	financial	audits,	and	final	project	reporting.	Reporting	to	senior	levels	of	government	has	become	burdensome	for	municipalities	when	the	average	resident	is	more	concerned	with	what	is	tangible	and	visible	such	as	good	roads	and	garbage	pickup	(Lobo,	2017).			 Lobo	argues	that	municipal	reporting	to	the	Province	is	“onerous	and	excessive”	(Lobo,	2017,	p.	26)	and	has	surveyed	municipalities	across	the	province.	Figure	1	(Lobo,	2017,	p.	25)	demonstrates	that	48%	of	respondents	agree	that	Provincial	reporting	requirements	are	impacting	the	ability	of	municipal	practitioners	to	productively	deliver	services.				
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Tools	to	Mitigate	the	Infrastructure	Deficit	Together	the	Province	and	municipalities	have	developed	tools	to	mitigate	municipal	infrastructure	deficits	by	using:	1)	capital	asset	inventories	and	amortization,	2)	long-range	capital	plans,	and	3)	asset	management	plans.		
Capital	Asset	Inventories	A	municipality’s	capital	assets	are	an	important	economic	resource	and	are	fundamental	to	the	delivery	of	municipal	programs	and	services.	In	recognition	of	the	importance	of	tangible	capital	assets	(TCA),	the	Public	Sector	Accounting	Board	(PSAB)	issued	new	financial	reporting	standards,	section	3150	of	the	PSAB	handbook,	with	respect	to	municipal	assets.	As	of	January	1,	2009,	PSAB	required	that	all	TCA	be	recorded	and	amortized	for	municipal	financial	statements.	Prior	to	2009,	municipal	financial	statements	did	not	include	any	information	relating	to	the	nature	and	age	of	a	municipality’s	assets.		Historical	cost,	accumulated	depreciation,	and	remaining	useful	life	data	on	infrastructure	assets	are	valuable	when	forecasting	the	maintenance	and	the	replacement	of	a	municipality’s	infrastructure	assets.	The	Province	also	amended	the	2009	Financial	Information	Return	(FIR)	to	
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include	TCA.	The	benefit	of	imposing	TCA	for	financial	statements	and	the	FIR	is	that	the	data	is	standardized	across	municipalities	and	available	for	analytical	and	planning	purposes.		
Long-Range	Capital	Plans		 Capital	planning	is	part	of	most	municipalities’	long-range	strategic	plans.	Prior	to	TCA,	the	municipal	operating	and	capital	budget	processes	were	typically	on	an	annual	cycle.	However,	with	a	greater	emphasis	on	TCA,	most	municipalities	have	transitioned	to	at	least	a	3-year	capital	budget	and	many	have	moved	to	a	5	or	10-year	cycle.	The	capital	budget	process	is	an	excellent	planning	tool.	Staff	prepares	and	Council	approves	the	capital	budget	based	on	the	community’s	needs.	There	are	two	issues	with	capital	plans	across	the	province:	1)	capital	budgets	are	prepared	in-house	and	therefore	the	format	is	not	standardized	which	limits	its	analytical	use,	and	2)	Council’s	requests	for	capital	projects	may	be	politically	motivated	and	may	not	take	into	consideration	value	for	money.		
Asset	Management	Plans		 Asset	management	planning	is	the	process	of	making	optimal	decisions	relating	to	the	building	and	operating,	maintaining	and	disposing	of	infrastructure	assets.	The	objective	of	an	Asset	Management	Plan	(AMP)	is	to	maximize	the	benefits	of	a	municipality’s	assets,	manage	the	risk,	and	provide	satisfactory	service	levels	to	the	public	in	a	sustainable	manner.	Using	the	information	from	an	AMP,	council	and	staff	can	determine	asset	deficiencies,	assess	remaining	useful	life,	and	plan	for	future	maintenance.	Ideally	AMPs	help	identify	the	optimal	time	in	an	
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asset’s	useful	life	to	make	repairs	in	order	to	avoid	a	total	“rip	and	replace”	of	the	asset.	Figure	1	below	(Ontario,	2016)	demonstrates	the	savings	that	can	be	achieved	from	proper	asset	management	planning	by	identifying	deterioration	of	assets	early	and	by	taking	action	to	rehabilitate	the	asset	throughout	its	useful	life	cycle.			
	Municipalities	were	required	to	have	AMPs	prepared	and	approved	by	councils	by	December	2013	for	core	infrastructure	assets	such	as	roads,	bridges,	water,	and	wastewater	assets.	Many	municipalities	hurried	to	comply	because	AMPs	were	required	to	meet	eligibility	requirements	for	grants.	This	produced	AMPs	that	were	ineffective	for	successful	planning.	Also,	because	various	consultants	from	across	the	province	created	many	municipalities’	AMPs,	the	non-standardized	formats	limited	analytical	use	at	the	Provincial	level.		
	 20	
Long-term	capital	budgets,	TCA,	and	AMPs	are	helpful	tools	to	mitigate	municipal	infrastructure	deficits	and	focus	capital	spending	on	the	most	critical	assets.		These	tools	could	become	more	beneficial	through	standardization.	Once	in	a	standardized	format,	capital	budgets	and	AMPs	could	be	used	to	determine	municipalities	with	critical	infrastructure	needs	across	the	Province	in	a	consistent	and	defensible	methodical	manner.	Next,	the	paper	will	provide	an	overview	on	the	newly	implemented	Ontario	Community	Infrastructure	Fund.			 	
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Ontario	Community	Infrastructure	Fund			 In	2014,	the	Province	introduced	the	Ontario	Community	Infrastructure	Fund	(OCIF)	as	a	permanent	program	to	fund	critical	infrastructure	projects	for	core	assets	-	roads,	bridges,	water	and	wastewater.	Small	Ontario	municipalities	with	populations	under	100,000	and	municipalities	north	of	the	Districts	of	Parry	Sound	and	Nipissing	qualify	for	the	formula-based	component	and	can	also	apply	for	the	application-based	component.	Local	Service	Boards,	agencies	contracted	by	the	Province	to	provide	municipal	services	in	a	community	but	are	not	part	of	an	incorporated	municipality,	also	qualify	for	OCIF.		OCIF,	as	previously	mentioned,	has	a	formula-based	component.	The	total	formula-based	funding	envelope	for	2017	is	approximately	$95	million	and	the	minimum	annual	funding	per	eligible	municipality	is	$50,000,	which	represents	a	$25,000	increase	over	the	initial	program	minimum.	The	formula-based	component	is	calculated	using	the	following	four	steps:		Step	1:	Determine	the	amount	of	core	infrastructure	owned	by	the	municipality	from	the	Financial	Information	Return.	The	best	of	the	2014	or	2015	FIR	data	is	used	–	whichever	yields	a	higher	value	for	the	municipality,		Step	2:	Calculate	the	infrastructure	index	by	comparing	a	municipality’s	core	infrastructure	to	its	weighted	property	assessment	and	median	household	income,	Step	3:	Determine	the	funding	per	$100,000	of	core	infrastructure	by	evaluating	a	municipality’s	infrastructure	index	and	how	it	relates	to	the	median	infrastructure	index	of	all	eligible	municipalities,	and		
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Step	4:	Calculate	the	grant	using	the	infrastructure	index	or	$50,000	whichever	is	greater	(Province	of	Ontario,	2017).	Weighted	property	assessment	is	taxable	assessment	multiplied	by	the	appropriate	tax	ratios.	Tax	ratios	distribute	the	tax	burden	between	property	tax	classes	relative	to	the	residential	tax	ratio,	which	is	“one”.	The	tax	ratio	for	a	commercial	property	is	set	higher	than	a	residential	property	as	the	assumption	is	that	a	commercial	property	consumes	municipal	services	at	a	higher	ratio	than	a	residential	property.			OCIF	also	has	an	Application-based	Component.	Approximately	$100	million	will	be	allocated	through	the	application-based	component	for	the	fiscal	year	2017-18	intake	top-up.	Application-based	eligibility	is	restricted	to	core	infrastructure	projects	that	are	part	of	a	municipality’s	AMP,	capital	construction	for	new	core	infrastructure	that	will	address	health	and	safety	concerns,	and	capital	maintenance	for	the	rehabilitation	or	replacement	of	core	infrastructure.	Municipalities	must	prepare	and	submit	applications	to	the	Province	annually	in	late	spring.	The	Province	will	review	and	evaluate	each	project	on	its	merits	and	then	award	funding	to	the	successful	applicants.		The	benefit	of	the	new	OCIF	is	that	it	provides	steady,	long-term	funding	for	small,	rural,	and	northern	communities	to	build	and	maintain	capital	assets	by	providing	targeted	funding	for	critical	core	infrastructure	projects.	Another	benefit	of	OCIF	is	its	transparency.	The	Province	posts	the	amount	of	the	municipal	formula-based	grant	as	well	as	the	successful	application-based	project	descriptions	and	grant	amounts.	A	major	disadvantage	of	OCIF	is	the	application	process.	OCIF	has	two	granting	components:	1)	a	formula-based	component,	and	2)	an	application-
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based	component.	The	latter	requires	a	written	application,	municipal	competition,	provincial	scrutiny,	and	grant	reporting.		As	a	result	of	the	OCIF	application-based	process,	grant	writing	firms	have	sprung	up	offering	assistance	to	draft	grant	applications.	The	fees	can	be	excessive	for	small	municipalities,	between	25%	and	40%	of	the	total	grant	if	the	application	is	successful.	OCIF	grants	are	non-matching.	A	matching	grant	requires	a	municipality	to	provide	a	portion	of	its	own	source	revenues	to	qualify	for	funding.	The	use	of	a	grant-writing	firm	transforms	a	non-matching	grant	to	a	matching	grant	because	the	fees	must	be	raised	through	own	source	revenues,	placing	a	strain	on	remaining	municipal	programs	and	services.			There	is	limited	information	regarding	OCIF	application-based	grant	allocations,	for	example	how	many	applications	are	submitted	and	for	what	projects,	or	what	criteria,	other	than	health	and	safety	concerns,	is	used	to	select	municipalities	that	are	worthy	of	funds.	Councils	want	to	know	why	their	application	was	not	successful	and	why	their	municipality	did	not	receive	funding.		This	paper	aims	to	determine	if	the	province	has	enough	data	available,	financial	and	statistical,	to	effectively	allocate	funds	based	on	infrastructure	need.	Data	from	the	Provincial	Financial	Information	Returns	(Ministry	of	Municipal	Affairs,	2015)	and	geographical	coordinates	(Wikipedia)	were	used	to	assess	the	Province’s	ability	to	allocate	funds	for	infrastructure.	Further	details	on	the	data	analysis	to	assess	the	Province’s	ability	to	allocate	funds	based	on	need,	will	be	discussed	in	the	appropriate	sections	of	this	paper.	
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This	research	paper	is	concerned	with	municipal	infrastructure	deficits,	the	burden	of	provincial	reporting	for	municipalities,	and	how	funds	from	senior	levels	of	government	can	be	allocated	efficiently	and	effectively	to	municipalities	with	infrastructure	needs.		This	paper	argues	that	the	application-based	component	of	the	OCIF	grant	exacerbates	the	burden	of	municipal	reporting	to	the	Province,	reduces	transparency,	and	impairs	consistency	at	the	Provincial	level.	This	paper	aims	to	determine	if	the	Province	has	enough	data	available,	financial	and	statistical,	to	effectively	allocate	funds	to	the	local	level	based	on	infrastructure	need.	Information	from	the	Provincial	Financial	Information	Returns	(Ministry	of	Municipal	Affairs,	2015)	and	geographical	coordinates	(Wikipedia)	were	used	to	assess	the	Province’s	ability	to	allocate	funds	for	infrastructure.	Details	on	the	data	analysis	to	assess	the	province’s	ability	to	allocate	funds	based	on	need,	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	sections	of	this	paper.		  
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Methodology	
The	following	section	provides	the	framework	used	to	answer	the	research	question:		 	
Does	the	Province	have	enough	financial	and	statistical	data	available	
to	execute	a	needs-based	grant	allocation	to	target	municipal	
infrastructure	investment	instead	of	utilizing	an	application	process	to	
allocate	funds?		The	Financial	Information	Return	(FIR)	is	the	main	data	collection	tool	used	by	the	Ministry	of	Municipal	Affairs	to	collect	annual	financial	and	statistical	information	from	municipalities	across	the	Province	of	Ontario.	The	FIR	is	a	standardized	document	with	multiple	schedules.	The	Ministry	updates	the	FIR	annually	to	comply	with	new	legislation	and	PSAB	reporting	requirements.		For	example,	the	2009	FIR	was	updated	to	include	tangible	capital	asset	information.	To	assist	municipalities	with	the	accurate	completion	of	the	FIR	it	was	designed	to	include	automatic	calculations,	verification	checks,	carry	forward	data,	and	opening	balances.	All	municipalities	must	submit	an	FIR	balanced	to	the	audited	financial	statements	on	or	before	May	31	for	the	previous	December	31	year-end.	Failure	to	submit	an	FIR	to	the	Province	may	impact	future	grant	funding	opportunities.		
Research	Design	The	data	points	contained	in	the	2015	FIR	were	downloaded	from	the	Ministry	of	Municipal	Affairs	–	Financial	Information	Return	website	(Province	of	Ontario)	for	all	municipalities.	The	data	was	then	matched	with	the	OCIF	Intake	1,	
	 26	
Intake2,	Intake	3	(application-based	component)	as	well	as	the	OCIF	formula-based	component	amounts	for	the	year	2015.	Local	Service	Boards	receiving	grant	funding	were	excluded	from	any	analysis	contained	in	this	paper.	Longitude	and	latitude	coordinates	were	also	provided	for	each	municipality	since	one	of	the	criteria	of	eligibility	for	OCIF	is	that	the	municipality	must	be	north	of	the	Districts	of	Parry	Sound	and	Nipissing.	Any	municipality	that	did	not	receive	formula-based	or	application-based	OCIF	was	ignored	in	the	data	sets.		The	Province	utilized	either	the	2014	or	2015	FIR	when	calculating	the	formula-based	component	of	the	OCIF	grant.		Therefore	2015	FIR	data	was	selected	for	use	in	this	research	design.	In	an	effort	to	explain	the	OCIF	Intake	(application-based	component	of	the	grant)	the	coefficient	of	determination	or	R-squared	(R2)	value	was	used	to	derive	the	correlations	between	the	dependent	variables	(OCIF	grant	amounts)	and	the	independent	variables	(2015	FIR	data	points).	“R-squared	is	a	statistical	measure	of	how	close	data	are	fitted	to	a	regression	line”	(Frost,	2013).		The	following	permutations	of	data	were	computed:	1) OCIF	Intake	1	and	2015	data	points	2) OCIF	Intake	2	and	2015	data	points	3) OCIF	Intake	3	and	2015	data	points	4) Total	OCIF	Intake	and	2015	data	points	5) Total	Intake	plus	2015	formula-based	component	and	2015	data	points,	and		6) 2015	formula-based	component	and	2015	data	points.			 	
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The	results	of	the	computation	are	provided	in	Table	1.		
Table	1	–	
Results	of	R2	
Calculation	
OCIF	Intake	
One	
OCIF	Intake	
Two	
OCIF	Intake	
Three	
Total		
OCIF	Intake	
	
Total	Intake	
plus	2015	
Formula	
2015	
Formula	
	
Average	R	
Squared		 0.0070180287	 0.0112201046	 0.0043468216	 0.0064694769	 0.0170352799	 0.2257165912	
Minimum	R	
Squared		 0.0000000315	 0.0000001100	 0.0000000289	 0.0000001361	 0.0000001568	 0.0000005115	
Maximum	R	
Squared	 0.1004097829	 0.0961602613	 0.0315362923	 0.0918668803	 0.1048305676	 0.9197047292	
Standard	
Deviation	 0.0113361059	 0.0148745161	 0.0042322892	 0.0103195552	 0.0204097149	 0.2656483104		 	Since	the	R2	values	and	standard	deviation	are	low	for	scenarios	1	through	5	there	is	minimal	correlation	between	the	dependent	and	independent	variables.	Therefore	a	statistical	model	using	regression	analysis	to	estimate	the	relationship	between	the	OCIF	application-based	grant	and	2015	FIR	data	points	and	to	predict	future	grant	amounts	was	not	predictive.	Appendix	A	contains	the	full	computation	for	all	data	points.	To	test	the	concept,	the	2015	formula-based	grant	was	also	run	though	the	same	computation.	Scenario	6	produced	significant	R2	values	and	standard	deviation,	which	was	to	be	expected	since	the	Province	uses	similar	data	to	calculate	the	formula-based	OCIF	grant	amounts.		Since	this	methodology	was	not	effective	to	predict	the	OCIF	application-based	grants	using	regression	analysis,	further	analysis	was	performed	using	the	FIR’s	key	performance	indicators	for	all	municipalities	for	the	years	2011	through	to	2015.			
Analysis	of	Key	Performance	Indicators		 Key	performance	indicators	(KPI)	measure	how	well	an	organization	is	achieving	critical	organizational	objectives.	The	Ministry	has	developed	six	KPIs	to	assess	the	financial	health	of	municipalities:		
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1) Operating	Surplus	Ratio:	The	Operating	Surplus	Ratio,	expressed	as	a	percentage,	is	an	indicator	of	the	extent	to	which	revenues	raised	cover	operational	expenses	only	or	are	available	for	capital	infrastructure.	A	negative	ratio	indicates	the	percentage	increase	required	to	achieve	break	even.	Operating	Surplus	is	calculated	by	dividing	a	municipality’s	net	operating	surplus	by	its	total	rates	(property	taxes,	user	fees,	and	service	charges)	revenue.	The	target	ratio	for	a	municipality	is	between	1%	and	15%.	A	ratio	over	15%	is	considered	advanced	by	the	Ministry.		2) Current	Ratio:	The	Current	Ratio	is	a	measure	of	a	municipality’s	ability	to	pay	short-term	obligations.	Current	Ratio	is	calculated	by	dividing	current	assets	by	current	liabilities.	The	target	is	greater	than	1:1	ratio.	3) Rates	Coverage	Ratio:	The	Rates	Coverage	Ratio	is	a	measure	of	the	municipality’s	ability	to	cover	its	expenditures	through	its	own	revenue.	Rates	Coverage	Ratio	is	calculated	by	dividing	the	total	rates	revenue	by	the	total	operating	expense.	The	basic	target	is	40	to	60%,	intermediate	is	60	to	90%,	and	the	advanced	target	is	greater	that	90%.		4) Debt	Service	Coverage	Ratio:	The	Debt	Service	Coverage	Ratio	is	a	measure	of	a	municipality’s	ability	to	service	its	debt	payments.	To	calculate	a	municipality’s	Debt	Service	Coverage	Ratio,	the	operating	surplus	before	interest	and	amortization	is	divided	by	the	sum	of	principle	and	interest	payments.	The	target	ratio	is	2.		5) Asset	Sustainability	Ratio:	The	Asset	Sustainability	Ratio	is	an	approximation	of	the	extent	to	which	a	municipality	is	replacing,	or	acquiring	new	assets	as	
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existing	infrastructure	reaches	the	end	of	its	useful	life.	The	target	is	greater	than	90%.	A	municipality	with	a	ratio	less	than	90%	is	not	sufficiently	maintaining	its	infrastructure	assets.	This	course	of	action	may	result	in	a	reduced	level	of	service	and	may	place	a	greater	burden	on	future	ratepayers.	The	Asset	Sustainability	Ratio	is	calculated	by	dividing	asset	additions	by	annual	amortization	expense.		6) Asset	Consumption	Ratio:	The	Asset	Consumption	Ratio	estimates	the	age	of	a	municipality’s	physical	assets.	It	measures	the	extent	to	which	depreciable	assets	have	been	consumed	by	comparing	the	total	depreciation	of	assets	against	the	historical	cost.	A	target	less	than	25%	signifies	new	infrastructure,	26%	to	50%	signifies	moderately	new	infrastructure,	51%	to	75%	signifies	moderately	old	infrastructure,	and	over	75%	signifies	old	infrastructure.	The	Asset	Consumption	Ratio	is	calculated	by	dividing	the	closing	amortization	balance	by	the	closing	historical	cost	balance.		KPIs	were	downloaded	from	the	FIR	website	for	all	municipalities	for	the	years	2011	through	to	2015.	At	the	time	of	the	download,	2016	FIR	was	not	available.	Data	from	2011	to	2014	was	used	to	identify	KPI	trends	prior	to	OCIF	grants.	KPI	data	from	2015	may	identify	improvements	related	to	2015	formula	and	Intake	1	grants.	The	municipalities	were	organized	into	three	groups:	1) Group	1	–	Municipalities	(27)	that	were	not	eligible	for	OCIF	and	did	not	receive	any	application	or	formula-based	funding,		2) Group	2	–	Municipalities	(268)	that	received	only	the	annual	formula-based	OCIF	grant,	and		
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3) Group	3	–	Municipalities	(147)	that	received	both	application	and	formula-based	OCIF	grant.		An	average	was	calculated	by	year,	for	each	group,	and	for	each	KPI	measure.	For	some	KPIs	where	the	measure	was	zero,	for	example	Debt	Service	Coverage	Ratio,	“N/A”	replaced	the	zero	as	to	not	skew	the	average	calculation.	Group	averages	for	each	KPI	were	placed	in	a	table	and	then	plotted	on	a	line	chart.	The	next	section	of	this	report	will	provide	the	results	and	an	interpretation	of	the	data.	Appendix	B	contains	Group	1	data,	Appendix	C	contains	Group	2	data,	and	Appendix	C	contains	Group	3	data.		
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Results	and	Interpretation	of	Data	
	 This	section	provides	the	results	of	the	KPI	analysis.	It	includes	an	interpretation	of	the	results	for	the	time	frame	leading	up	to	OCIF	and	evaluates	the	impact	of	the	first	formula	and	the	effectiveness	of	application-based	grants.	It	also	provides	a	selection	of	specific	municipalities,	both	recipients	and	non-recipients	of	Intake	funds,	detailing	the	impact	of	OCIF	grants	on	its	KPIs.		
Operating	Surplus	Ratio:		 Operating	Surplus	Ratio	is	an	indicator	of	the	extent	to	which	revenues	raised	cover	operational	expenses	only	or	are	available	for	capital	infrastructure.	Average	Operating	Surplus	Ratios	were	calculated	and	graphed	in	Table	2.	For	ease	of	representation,	the	target	mid-point	(7.5%)	was	used.		Table	2	demonstrates	that	on	average	Group	1	has	the	ability	to	raise	revenues	to	support	its	operating	and	instrastructure	requirements	through	its	rates	revenue	as	well	as	the	current	levels	of	senior	government	assistance.	This	group	is	also	trending	in	an	upward	direction	from	the	target	suggesting	that	operating	surpluses	are	increasing.	Group	2	and	Group	3	were	struggling	to	meet	operating	and	capital	requirements	prior	to	2014	but	are	now	trending	away	from	the	limit	since	the	initiation	of	OCIF.	This	paper	would	argure	that	after	analyzing	the	average	Operating	Surplus	Ratios	across	the	Province,	the	OCIF	formula	and	application	grants	are	effectively	targeting	municipalities	with	lower	Operating	Surplus	Ratios.	In	municipalities,	operating	expenses	take	priorty	over	capital	projects.	Lower	ratios	indicate	a	reduced	ability	to	fund	infrastructure	needs.			
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Current	Ratio:	The	Current	Ratio	is	a	measure	of	a	municipality’s	ability	to	pay	short-term	obligations.	Average	Current	Ratios	were	calculated	and	graphed	in	Table	3.	Table	3	indicates	that	all	groups	on	average	are	maintaining	a	consistent	level	for	the	Current	Ratio	and	are	all	exceeding	the	target.	However,	this	paper	is	argues	that	there	is	an	indication	that	Groups	2	and	3	are	retaining	too	much	cash	and	not	effectively	utilizing	liquid	resources	to	respond	to	operating	and	capital	requirements	because	the	target	for	both	groups	is	well	above	the	target	of	1:1.	
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Rates	Coverage	Ratio:	The	Rates	Coverage	Ratio	is	a	measure	of	the	municipality’s	ability	to	cover	its	expenditures	through	its	own	revenue.	Average	Rates	Coverage	Ratios	were	calculated	and	graphed	in	Table	4.	Table	4	indicates	that	all	groups,	on	average,	are	exceeding	the	Rates	Coverage	ratio.	Group	2	and	Group	3	are	very	closely	aligned	with	a	ratio	between	65%	and	70%.	The	Group	1	ratio	is	approximately	74%.		Although	these	are	strong	indicators	for	the	Rates	Coverage	Ratio,	Groups	2	and	3	are	falling	behind	Group1	and	potentially	require	assistance.			
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Debt	Service	Coverage	Ratio:	The	Debt	Service	Coverage	Ratio	is	a	measure	of	a	municipality’s	ability	to	service	its	debt	payments.	Municipalities	can	only	incur	debt	for	infrastructure	assets;	debt	cannot	be	incurred	for	operating	expenses	such	as	salaries	and	benefits.		Average	Debt	Service	Coverage	Ratios	were	calculated	and	graphed	in	Table	5.		Table	5	indicates	that	on	average	all	groups	are	maintaining	a	healthy	Debt	Service	Coverage	Ratio.	Group	2’s	trend	is	level,	which	would	indicate	that	as	old	debt	is	retired,	new	debt	is	acquired.	This	practice	allows	a	municipality	to	maintain	and	renew	infrastructure	assets	with	minimal	impact	on	the	municipal	levy.	The	chart	indicates	that	Group	1	had	a	significant	increase	to	debt	levels	between	2013	and	2014.	This	would	indicate	that	Group	1	has	taken	an	aggressive	stance	toward	
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infrastructure	renewal.	However	Group	3	has	been	trending	upwards	from	the	target	since	2013,	which	would	indicate	that	this	Group	is	not	incurring	any	new	debt	for	infrastructure	needs.		This	indicates	that	this	group	may	be	in	receipt	of	funds	that	could	be	distributed	to	other	groups	in	need.			
	
Asset	Sustainability	Ratio:	The	Asset	Sustainability	Ratio	is	an	approximation	of	the	extent	to	which	a	municipality	is	replacing,	or	acquiring	new	assets	as	existing	infrastructure	reaches	the	end	of	its	useful	life.	Average	Asset	Sustainability	Ratios	were	calculated	and	graphed	in	Table	6.		Table	6	indicates	that,	on	average,	municipalities	are	replacing	and	acquiring	new	assets	regularly.	Group	1’s	ratio	trended	toward	the	target	prior	to	2013	but	
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from	2014	onward	it	is	trending	away	from	the	target	indicating	that	Group	1	is	replacing	and	acquiring	assets.	Group	2	and	Group	3	has	followed	a	similar	pattern	as	Group	1.	However	Group	2’s	Asset	Sustainability	Ratio	is	trending	toward	the	target	while	Group	3’s	ratio	is	trending	away	from	the	target.	This	indicates	that	municipalities	in	Group	3	are	replacing	or	acquiring	assets	more	effectively	than	municipalities	in	Group	2.	This	paper	would	argure	that	after	assessing	the	average	Asset	Sustainablity	KPI	of	municipalites	across	the	Province,	the	OCIF	formula	and	application-based	grants	are	effectively	targeting	municipalities	(Groups	2	and	3)	with	infrastructure	needs	when	compared	to	KPI	of	Group	1.		
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Asset	Consumption	Ratio:	The	Asset	Consumption	Ratio	estimates	the	age	of	a	municipality’s	physical	assets.	Average	Asset	Consumption	Ratios	were	calculated	and	graphed	in	Table	7.		The	Ministry’s	target	for	Asset	Consumption	is	less	than	50%	and	all	three	groups	are	well	within	the	limit.	However,	on	average,	Group	1	is	performing	approximately	14%	better	and	the	ratio	is	stable	where	Group	2	and	3	are	closely	aligned	and	trending	toward	the	limit.	This	paper	would	argure	that	after	analyizing	the	average	Asset	Consumption	KPI	across	the	Province,	the	OCIF	formula	and	application-based	grants	are	effectively	targeting	municipalities	(Groups	2	and	3)	with	infrastructure	needs	but	the	impact	of	the	grant	is	not	yet	reflected	in	Asset	Consumption	Ratio	on	average.		
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Group	Case	Analysis			 In	this	section	of	the	paper,	the	KPIs	of	selected	individual	municipalities	will	be	studied	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	For	each	municipality	there	will	be	an	interpretation	of	the	KPIs	for	the	time	frame	leading	up	to	OCIF	and	an	assessment	of	the	impact	of	the	first	formula	and	the	effectiveness	of	application-based	grants	on	its	KPIs.	Municipal	KPIs	that	do	not	meet	targets	will	be	highlighted,	in	red,	in	the	tables	below.			
Group	1	Cases		 Municipalities	in	Group	1	are	ineligible	for	OCIF	because	populations	exceed	100,000.	For	Group	1,	with	the	exception	of	Current	Ratios	for	Region	of	Durham,	Region	of	Halton,	and	City	of	Toronto	(see	Appendix	B)	all	are	performing	well	according	to	the	KPI	measurement	criteria.	Most	of	the	municipalities	in	Group	1	are	classified	as	advanced	with	respect	to	Operating	Surplus	Ratio	indicating	that	these	municipalities	have	more	than	adequate	resources	to	cover	operational	expenses	and	fund	capital	infrastructure	projects.	The	Province	has	made	a	fair	assessment	by	not	providing	any	OCIF	for	Group	1	municipalities	as	the	KPIs	indicate	there	is	enough	capacity	to	meet	infrastructure	needs	without	OCIF	funding.	
Group	2	Cases		 Municipalities	in	Group	2	are	eligible	for	OCIF	but	have	only	received	the	formula-based	component.	There	is	no	data	available	to	determine	if	these	municipalities	applied	for	and	were	refused	application-based	funding.	County	of	
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Oxford	and	Township	of	Wellesley	were	selected	for	further	analysis.	Both	Oxford	and	Wellesley	are	in	Group	2	but	the	KPIs	for	each	are	vastly	different.		
County	of	Oxford		 For	the	years	2015	to	2019,	the	County	of	Oxford	will	receive	$5,545,693	(2015	-	$530,194;	2016	-	$530,194;	2017	-	$966,411;	2018	-	$1,373,162;	and	2019	-	$2,145,702)	in	formula-based	OCIF	funding.	Prior	to	OCIF	funding,	all	of	Oxford’s	KPIs	met	or	exceeded	the	KPI	targets.	Oxford’s	Asset	Sustainment	Ratio	is	well	above	the	Ministry’s	target	of	90%.	The	Asset	Consumption	Ratio	indicates	that	Oxford	has	relatively	new	infrastructure.		
Table	8	-	COUNTY	OF	
OXFORD	
2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	
Operating	Surplus	Ratio	
(Target	0%	to	+15%)	 22.64%	 26.50%	 27.05%	 31.68%	 25.18%	
Current	Ratio		
(Target	>=	1:1)	 4.45	 6.30	 6.45	 7.30	 7.28	
Rates	Coverage	Ratio		
(Target	>=	40%)	 71.96%	 81.09%	 76.16%	 73.89%	 74.35%	
Debt	Service	Coverage	
Ratio	(Target	>=	2)	 4.61	 5.84	 5.62	 6.06	 5.35	
Asset	Sustainability	Ratio	
(Target	>90%)	 352.08%	 125.23%	 214.35%	 156.63%	 207.05%	
Asset	Consumption	
(Target	<	50%)	 32.78%	 34.12%	 34.17%	 34.97%	 35.30%	
	
Township	of	Wellesley	For	the	years	2015	to	2019,	the	Township	of	Wellesley	will	receive	$1,391,468	(2015	-	$141,423;	2016	-	$141,423;	2017	-	$242,708;	2018	-	$343,279;	and	2019	-	$522,635)	in	formula-based	OCIF	funding.	Many	of	Wellesley’s	KPIs	indicate	a	municipality	that	is	struggling	to	meet	its	obligations.	Revenue	raised	does	not	adequately	cover	operating	expenses	nor	would	it	adequately	fund	capital	investments.	Wellesley’s	Asset	Sustainability	Ratio	is	moving	slowly	in	a	positive	direction	toward	the	target	and	the	Asset	Consumption	Ration	indicates	that	
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infrastructure	is	moderately	old.	However,	the	Debt	Service	Coverage	ratio	supports	that	Wellesley	can	issue	debt	to	fund	infrastructure	requirements.		
Table	9	-	TOWNSHIP	
OF	WELLESLEY	
2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	
Operating	Surplus	Ratio	
(Target	0%	to	+15%)	 -61.84%	 -71.08%	 -60.25%	 -65.89%	 -49.96%	
Current	Ratio		
(Target	>=	1:1)	 3.31	 3.37	 2.87	 2.06	 2.89	
Rates	Coverage	Ratio		
(Target	>=	40%)	 46.11%	 45.25%	 45.99%	 47.90%	 49.61%	
Debt	Service	Coverage	
Ratio	(Target	>=	2)	 12.27	 8.37	 9.86	 8.03	 11.68	
Asset	Sustainability	Ratio	
(Target	>90%)	 27.16%	 26.56%	 24.74%	 38.81%	 42.13%	
Asset	Consumption	
(Target	<	50%)	 56.49%	 59.42%	 62.09%	 64.64%	 67.09%			 Given	that	Group	2	municipalities	received	the	formula-based	component	of	OCIF	and	since	the	cases	of	Oxford	and	Wellesley	contain	very	different	KPI	results,	this	may	indicate	that	the	process	is	not	benefiting	all	municipalities	equally.	
Group	3	Cases		 Municipalities	in	Group	3	qualify	for	OCIF	and	have	received	the	formula-based	component	as	well	as	at	least	one	Intake	grant.	Township	of	Plummer	Additional,	Municipality	of	Highlands	East,	and	City	of	Peterborough	were	selected	for	further	analysis.	Again,	Plummer	Additional,	Highland	East,	and	Peterborough	are	in	Group	3	but	the	KPIs	for	each	are	vastly	different.		
Township	of	Plummer	Additional	For	the	years	2015	to	2019,	the	Township	of	Plummer	Additional	will	receive	$200,000	(2015	-	$25,000;	2016	-	$25,000;	2017	-	$50,000;	2018	-	$50,000;	and	2019	-	$50,000)	in	formula-based	OCIF	funding.	Plummer	Additional	received	a	total	of	$693,000	in	application-based	funding	(Intake	1	-	$	346,500,	and	Intake	3	-	
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$346,500).	Although	the	Operating	Surplus	Ratio	and	Asset	Sustainability	Ratios	indicate	improvement	in	2015,	many	of	Plummer	Additional’s	KPIs	from	2011	to	2014	indicate	a	municipality	that	is	challenged	to	meet	its	commitments.	The	Asset	Consumption	Ratio	for	Plummer	Additional’s	suggests	that	its	infrastructure	is	moderately	old	and	the	Debt	Service	Ratio	indicates	that	Plummer	Additional	has	no	debt.		Plummer	Additional	could	incur	debt	to	alleviate	some	infrastructure	issues.		
Table	10	-	
TOWNSHIP	OF	
PLUMMER	
ADDITIONAL	
2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	
Operating	Surplus	Ratio	
(Target	0%	to	+15%)	 -24.28%	 -3.96%	 -9.67%	 -5.10%	 11.42%	
Current	Ratio		
(Target	>=	1:1)	 7.92	 8.95	 10.72	 14.92	 11.29	
Rates	Coverage	Ratio		
(Target	>=	40%)	 51.43%	 60.32%	 57.93%	 58.85%	 57.92%	
Debt	Service	Coverage	
Ratio	(Target	>=	2)	 N/A		 N/A		 N/A		 N/A		 N/A		
Asset	Sustainability	Ratio	
(Target	>90%)	 86.08%	 47.69%	 83.27%	 38.21%	 127.85%	
Asset	Consumption	
(Target	<	50%)	 64.73%	 67.18%	 67.86%	 70.45%	 70.75%	
	
Municipality	of	Highland	East	For	the	years	2015	to	2019,	the	Municipality	of	Highland	East	will	receive	$200,000	(2015	-	$25,000;	2016	-	$25,000;	2017	-	$50,000;	2018	-	$50,000;	and	2019	-	$50,000)	in	formula-based	OCIF	funding.	Highland	East	received	a	total	of	$851,534	in	application-based	funding	(Intake	1	-	$	283,589	and	Intake	2	-	$567,945).	KPIs	indicate	that	Highland	East	is	financially	healthy	and	has	not	issued	any	debt.			 	
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Table	11	-
MUNICIPALITY	OF	
HIGHLANDS	EAST	
2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	
Operating	Surplus	Ratio	
(Target	0%	to	+15%)	 -1.39%	 0.07%	 5.58%	 12.60%	 13.46%	
Current	Ratio		
(Target	>=	1:1)	 4.00	 4.09	 4.05	 5.04	 5.53	
Rates	Coverage	Ratio		
(Target	>=	40%)	 72.71%	 76.30%	 73.41%	 79.17%	 76.99%	
Debt	Service	Coverage	
Ratio	(Target	>=	2)	 N/A		 N/A		 N/A		 N/A		 N/A		
Asset	Sustainability	Ratio	
(Target	>90%)	 126.35%	 110.13%	 159.23%	 170.70%	 134.24%	
Asset	Consumption	
(Target	<	50%)	 41.35%	 42.93%	 44.29%	 43.92%	 44.87%	
	
City	of	Peterborough	For	the	years	2015	to	2019,	the	City	of	Peterborough	will	receive	$5,287,009	(2015	-	$457,719;	2016	-	$457,719;	2017	-	$934,977;	2018	-	$1,331,308;	and	2019	-	$2,105,286)	in	formula-based	OCIF	funding.	Peterborough	received	a	total	of	$3,597,500	in	application-based	funding	(Intake	1	-	$	1,597,500	and	Intake	2	-	$2,000,000).	Prior	to	OCIF,	all	of	Peterborough’s	KPIs	indicate	a	municipality	that	has	more	than	adequate	resources	to	fund	operating	and	capital	projects.	The	Asset	Consumption	Ratio	indicates	that	Peterborough’s	infrastructure	is	relatively	new.		
Table	12	-	CITY	OF	
PETERBOROUGH	
2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	
Operating	Surplus	Ratio	
(Target	0%	to	+15%)	 17.15%	 16.29%	 14.87%	 11.95%	 12.05%	
Current	Ratio		
(Target	>=	1:1)	 3.75	 4.04	 2.99	 2.49	 2.20	
Rates	Coverage	Ratio		
(Target	>=	40%)	 64.64%	 66.64%	 65.40%	 66.80%	 64.43%	
Debt	Service	Coverage	
Ratio	(Target	>=	2)	 4.33	 4.86	 4.28	 4.11	 3.91	
Asset	Sustainability	Ratio	
(Target	>90%)	 323.85%	 248.97%	 213.11%	 200.24%	 174.70%	
Asset	Consumption	
(Target	<	50%)	 39.42%	 38.04%	 38.61%	 38.69%	 39.47%			 At	the	macro	level,	when	KPIs	are	averaged	to	assess	the	effectiveness	and	impact	of	OCIF	on	municipal	KPIs	it	appears	that	the	Province	has	apportioned	the	
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grant	effectively	to	municipalities	with	infrastructure	needs	with	the	exception	of	Debt	Service	Coverage	Ratio	for	Group	3.	It	appears	that	this	group	received	substantial	application-based	funding	when	some	of	its	infrastructure	requirements	could	have	been	funded	by	debt.	However,	at	the	micro	level	when	assessing	individual	municipalities,	the	OCIF	is	penalizing	municipalities	such	as	Wellesley,	and	Plummer	Additional	and	over	compensating	municipalities	such	as	Oxford,	Peterborough,	and	Highland	East.	The	human	element	of	grant	application	review,	ranking	and	selection	has	favoured	some	municipalities	more	than	others.		
Application	Effectiveness	
	 After	an	analysis	of	municipal	KPIs,	it	appears	that	the	human	element	of	review,	ranking,	and	selection	of	grant	applications	has	produced	a	less	than	equitable	re-distribution	of	revenues	from	the	Province	to	local	governments.	For	the	application-based	component	of	OCIF	to	be	effective,	the	funding	should	have	benefited	municipalities	with	poor	KPIs	with	the	goal	that	all	municipalities	have	similar	KPIs.	For	example,	municipalities	with	low	KPIs	would	receive	greater	amounts	of	funding	until	KPIs	improve	and	municipalities	with	high	KPIs	would	receive	low	amounts	of	funding	until	KPIs	start	to	deteriorate.		Peterborough	is	an	example	of	a	municipality	with	high	KPIs	yet	it	received	almost	$9	million	in	OCIF.	Was	the	Peterborough	case	an	exercise	in	“value	for	money”	for	the	Province?	Was	there	something	else,	beyond	financial,	happening	with	the	City	of	Peterborough?	With	these	atypical	cases	identified,	why	would	the	Province	not	want	to	move	to	a	strictly	formula-based,	with	conditions,	grant	model	such	as	Canada	Gas	Tax	for	OCIF?	
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A	formula-based	grant	allocation	model	would	produce	a	defensible	and	transparent	allocation	model.	Councils	want	to	know	why	their	municipality	did	not	receive	funds.	A	formula-based	allocation	would	also	ensure	non-partisan	grant	awards.		A	second	benefit	to	a	formula-based	grant	system	is	reduced	provincial	reporting.	Provincial	reporting	is	considered	a	drain	on	municipal	resources.	Municipalities	need	to	focus	on	modernization,	effective	delivery	of	services,	and	infrastructure	improvement	(Lobo,	2017).	Many	application-based	grants	require	formal	expressions	of	interest,	complex	applications,	municipal	competition	for	funds,	senior	government	review	and	ranking,	grant	financial	audits,	and	final	project	reporting.	Formula-based	grants,	with	conditions	and	reduced	reporting,	allow	municipalities	to	focus	on	what	is	important	to	communities.		A	third	benefit	is	predictable	and	stable	funding.		“Lack	of	predictable	funding	makes	it	difficult	for	municipalities	to	plan	expenditures.	Capital	grants,	in	particular,	need	to	be	maintained	for	sufficiently	long	periods	of	time	to	allow	municipalities	to	sustain	capital	investments”	(Slack	E.	,	Provincial-Local	Fiscal	Transfers	in	Canada,	2009,	p.	28).	For	municipalities,	the	size	of	the	grant	is	important	but	for	planning	purposes,	predictable	and	stable	funding	is	essential.		A	less	obvious	but	important	benefit	is	the	reduction	in	need	for	professional	grant	writers.	Employees	working	for	small	municipalities	must	wear	many	“hats”	and	the	current	skill	set	may	not	include	grant	writing.	The	upsurge	of	grant-writing	firms	has	placed	small	municipalities	between	a	“rock	and	a	hard	place”.	If	the	municipality	applies	for	the	grant	on	its	own,	there	is	a	danger	it	won’t	be	successful.	
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If	the	municipality	uses	a	grant-writing	firm,	there	is	a	danger	that	it	will	be	successful	and	have	to	pay	the	hefty	fee.	Grants	should	be	awarded	based	on	financial	merit	and	need.		A	formula-based	grant	provides	local	fiscal	autonomy.	The	flexibility	of	formula-based	grants	such	as	Canada	Gas	Tax	allows	for	local	fiscal	autonomy.	Under	Canada	Gas	Tax,	municipalities	can	spend	the	grant	as	it	choses	as	long	as	it	is	spent	on	infrastructure	improvements	(AMO,	2017).	Councils	and	management	are	closer	to	needs	of	the	community	and	residents	providing	a	major	benefit.		And	lastly,	formula-based	grants	eliminate	the	potential	of	municipal	gaming	–	purposely	ignoring	the	maintenance	of	an	asset	with	the	hope	that	the	Province	will	step	in	with	funding.		Although	there	are	strong	benefits	of	formula-based	grant	systems	there	are	also	strong	arguments	for	application-based	funding.	Canada	as	a	country	is	too	large	and	diverse	to	effectively	allocate	funds	through	an	application	process.	Due	to	the	vast	diversity	of	the	country,	the	Federal	government	chose	an	easy	method	to	allocate	Canada	Gas	Tax	funds,	which	is	also	easy	to	understand.	The	Province	has	a	better	understanding	of	the	unique	infrastructure	pressures	of	local	government	making	the	application	process	effective.		There	may	be	political	reasons	for	an	application-based	system.	The	Province	may	want	to	keep	the	application	process	in	place	due	to	the	potential	for	grant	awards	to	buy	votes	from	opposition-held	ridings.		Councils	have	an	interest	in	re-election.	The	drive	to	remain	on	Council	may	create	an	environment	of	poor	decision-making.	Spending	must	take	into	
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consideration	value	for	money	to	ensure	effective	use	of	resources.	Municipalities	are	creatures	of	the	Province	and	the	Province	needs	to	maintain	control	over	funds.	If	AMPs	were	standardized	the	Province	could	utilize	the	data	to	effectively	target	municipalities	that	are	in	need	of	infrastructure	assistance.	With	standardized	AMPs,	similar	to	the	FIR,	the	Province	would	have	an	effective	tool	to:	1) Target	municipalities	with	infrastructure	needs,		2) Measure	the	performance	of	recipients,	and	3) Hold	municipalities	and	Councils	responsible	for	capital	spending	and	infrastructure	deficits.			 	
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Conclusion	
	 Small	and	rural	municipalities	are	facing	infrastructure	deficits	due	to	the	inability	to	raise	sufficient	funds	through	property	taxes.	Federal	and	Provincial	governments	collect	92	cents	of	every	tax	dollar	and	must	step	in	to	re-distribute	revenues	to	local	governments	for	infrastructure	needs.		The	goal	of	this	research	was	to	determine	if	the	Province	has	enough	financial	and	statistical	data	available	to	execute	a	needs-based	grant	allocation	to	target	municipalities	with	infrastructure	needs	instead	of	an	application	process.	Currently,	the	Province	has	data	from	the	FIR,	which	contains	a	wealth	of	information	that	could	be	used	to	assess	the	financial	health	of	each	municipality.	The	data	from	the	2015	FIR	was	not	sufficient	to	provide	a	new	model	to	allocate	both	the	formula	and	application	components	of	OCIF.			 A	secondary	goal	of	this	paper	was	to	investigate	the	effectiveness	of	the	OCIF	formula	and	application-based	grant.	The	Province	does	use	data	to	allocate	a	portion	of	OCIF	through	the	formula-based	component	and	uses	an	application	process	to	allocate	the	balance.	However,	upon	review	of	the	financial	KPIs	of	municipalities,	there	is	an	indication	that	the	OCIF	process	is	not	benefiting	all	municipalities	equally	and	leaving	some	municipalities	behind.		While	no	revenue	re-distribution	method	is	perfect,	the	Province	can	do	a	better	job	allocating	funds	to	municipalities	with	real	infrastructure	needs	with	better	data.	A	standardized	AMP	would	give	the	Province	the	ability	to	target	municipalities	with	infrastructure	needs,	measure	performance	of	recipients,	and	
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hold	Councils	responsible	while	at	the	same	time	provide	municipalities	and	communities	with	much	needed	local	autonomy.			 	
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